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Abstract—Secure transmission in large-scale MISO systems em-
ploying artificial noise (AN) is studied under the per-antenna
constant envelope (CE) constraint. Achievable secrecy rate of the
per-antenna CE precoding scheme for large-scale MISO is analyzed
and compared with that of the matched filter linear precoding.
A two-stage per-antenna CE precoding scheme for joint signal-
plus-AN transmission is proposed. The first stage determines the
per-antenna CE precoding for the information-bearing signal. A
properly generated AN using an iteration algorithm is incorporated
into the transmit signal in the second stage such that the combined
signal-plus-AN satisfies the per-antenna CE constraint and the AN
is orthogonal to the user channel. It is shown that compared to
conventional per-antenna CE transmission, this joint signal-plus-AN
secure transmission scheme does not require additional transmit
power. An alternative low-complexity AN generation scheme which
uses a separate antenna to cancel the AN leakage to the intended
user introduced by randomly generated AN is also proposed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) antenna system is a
promising technology to exploit spatial diversity and improve
radio spectral efficiency. This is especially important to the design
of future high data rate wireless communication systems where
the scarce of spectra is becoming a critical limitation. The MIMO
technology has been extensively studied in the literature and
has been incorporated into concurrent wireless communication
standards such as LTE and the latest versions of Wi-Fi. However,
as wireless technologies are evolving, small portable devices, e.g.
smartphones, will lead the mobile IP traffic growth [1]. Because
it is in general not practical to implement multiple antennas and
the associated complex hardware/software on such small devices
due to the size and energy constraints, advantages of the MIMO
technology are greatly forfeited in such scenarios.
Large-scale MIMO, or massive MIMO, is an emerging revolu-
tionary base station (BS) technology based on MIMO to mitigate
the above discrepancies [2] [3]. It uses a large excess of (typically
hundreds of) very low power (in the order of mW) antenna units at
the BS to serve low-complexity single-antenna mobile terminals
(MT). Remarkable improvements in rates as well as in spectral
and power efficiency can be achieved by focusing the radiating
power into the ever-smaller MT spots with the very large antenna
array. Massive MIMO is therefore capable of achieving robust
performance at low signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR)
with highly efficient and inexpensive implementations.
Equipping large antenna array in massive MIMO systems
requires each antenna element and its associated radio-frequency
(RF) electronics, e.g. power amplifiers (PAs), to be inexpen-
sive and power-efficient. However, cheaply manufactured PAs
are in general non-linear devices, which suffer from linearity
issues when processing signals with large amplitude-variations.
A per-antenna constant envelope (CE) nonlinear precoding was
considered in single-user massive MIMO systems in [4]. It
was shown that under the per-antenna CE constraint at the BS
transmitter, an equivalent single-input-single-output (SISO) model
over additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) is obtained for
multiple-input-single-output (MISO) system where we have a
single-user equipped with a single-antenna [4]. When sufficiently
large number of antennas are used, the corresponding achievable
rate under per-antenna CE constraint is close to the capacity
of the MISO channel under the average-only power constraint
in high-power regime. More recently, the idea of per-antenna
CE precoding has been extended to multi-user massive MIMO
systems over flat and frequency-selective fading channels [5] [6].
Information security is a critical concern in communication
system design. It is particularly important to wireless commu-
nications because of the broadcast nature of the open media.
The notion of physical-layer (PHY) security has been attracting
increasing attention from both academia and industry. As a
complement to cryptography-based security strategies, the PHY-
based approach improves security of the communication from
the perfect secrecy perspective. In the case of passive attacks,
i.e. eavesdropping, to MIMO systems, it has been shown that
simultaneously transmitting both the information-bearing signal
and properly designed artificial noise (AN) is an efficient way to
improve the secrecy rate [7]. The application of AN-based secure
transmissions for multi-cell massive MIMO systems has been
recently studied in [8], [9]. However, design and performance
of such security enhancing strategies under the per-antenna CE
constraint have yet been investigated.
In this work, we present our recent investigations of incorpo-
rating AN-based PHY security strategies into large-scale MISO
systems under the per-antenna CE constraint. Different AN gen-
eration strategies are considered; the corresponding improvement
to the secrecy capacity is studied.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Constant Envelope Precoding for Large-Scale MISO
In a MISO system with Nt transmit (Tx) antennas and one
single receive (Rx) antenna, the complex channel gain between
the ith Tx antenna and the Rx antenna is hi, i = 1, . . . , Nt. The
total channel vector is h = [h1, . . . , hNt ]. Given the complex
transmit signal from the ith antenna be xi, the complex received
signal of the user is
y = hx+ n =
Nt∑
i=1
hixi + n, (1)
where x = [x1, . . . , xNt ]T is the vector form of the Tx signal,
and n ∼ CN (0, σ2) is a zero-mean circular-symmetric additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the receiver with variance σ2.
With conventional linear matched filter (MF) precoder, the Tx
signal x is the information-bearing signal s multiplied by an MF
beamforming vector w ∈ CNt
xMF =
√
PTws =
√
PT
h†
‖h‖s, (2)
where average-only power constraint PT is adopted. (·)† is the
conjugate transpose operator, and ‖ ·‖ denotes the 2-norm. Under
the per-antenna CE constraint, as in [4], each antenna transmits
at a constant power PT
Nt
. The Tx signal xi is in the form xi =√
PT
Nt
ejθ
u
i , where θui ∈ (−pi, pi] is the information-bearing phase
of the ith Tx antenna. The received signal (1) then becomes
y =
√
PT
Nt
Nt∑
i=1
hie
jθui + n. (3)
When perfect channel state information (CSI) is available at
both the transmitter and the receiver, the received signal y reduces
to the output of a SISO system
y =
√
PT u+ n, (4)
where u =
∑Nt
i=1
hie
jθu
i√
Nt
is the noise-free information signal
expected by the intended receiver. The per-antenna CE precod-
ing maps the information symbol u to the information-bearing
transmit phases θui , i = 1, . . . , Nt, based on the channel h. The
resulting transmit signal has a constant envelop
√
PT
Nt
on every
antenna branch. The objective of per-antenna CE precoding is to
determine Θu = [θu1 , . . . , θuNt ] given the intended received signal
u and the channel h, i.e. the parameterized mapping
Φ(u;h) , Θu. (5)
Given the channel h, all possible noise-free received signal u
in (4) of the per-antenna CE transmission lie in the set
M(h) ,
{
1√
N
Nt∑
i=1
hie
jθi , θi ∈ (−pi, pi], i = 1, . . . , Nt
}
.
(6)
The set M(h) was shown to have a doughnut-like shape on the
complex plain [4]. The key properties of M(h) include
1) The set M(h) is circular symmetric, i.e. z ∈ M(h) also
implies zejϕ ∈ M(h) for all ϕ ∈ (−pi, pi].
2) The maximum value of |u| for u ∈ M(h) is
M(h) =
1√
Nt
Nt∑
i=1
|hi| = 1√
Nt
‖h‖1. (7)
3) The minimum value of |u| for u ∈ M(h), denoted by
m(h), is greater than zero and is upper bounded by
m(h) ≤ 1√
Nt
max
i=1,...,Nt
|hi| = 1√
Nt
‖h‖∞. (8)
B. AN-Based Secure Transmission
Security of the single-cell single-user MISO downlink is con-
sidered in flat-fading. The BS has size Nt antenna array while
the MT has only a single antenna. A single-antenna eavesdropper
(Eve) is randomly located in the cell region. The study can be
extended to eavesdropping scenarios where the eavesdropper is
Fig. 1. The single-user massive MIMO system with a passive eavesdropper.
equipped with Ne < Nt antennas. The eavesdropper aims to
retrieve the information transmitted to the mobile terminal.
As a starting point, we first focus on the single-eavesdropper
single-antenna case which is shown by Fig. 1. We still use hi
to denote the complex channel gain between the ith BS antenna
and the MT; gi is the complex channel gain between the ith BS
antenna and the eavesdropper. h ∈ CNt represents the channel
gain row vector between the BS and the MT with hi as its ith
entry. Similarly, g ∈ CNt is the channel gain row vector between
the BS and the eavesdropper. The BS then can use up to (Nt−1)
degrees of freedom of the antenna array for AN transmission to
degrade Eve’s ability of decoding the user message [7].
We now illustrate the concept of AN-based secure transmission
in conventional linear precoding system where the average-only
power constraint is considered. The transmitted signal-plus-AN
is
x =
√
ηPTws+
√
(1− η)PTVz
=
√
ηPTws+
Nt−1∑
k=1
√
(1− η)PTvkzk
(9)
where η ∈ [0, 1] is the average Tx power allocation factor for
user information, z = [z1, . . . , zNt−1]T ∈ CN (0Nt−1, INt−1) is
the AN vector, and V = [v1, . . . ,vNt−1] ∈ CNt×(Nt−1) is an AN
shaping matrix with ||vk|| = 1, k = 1, . . . , Nt − 1. The received
signal at the mobile terminal is then given by
yr = h(
√
ηPTws+
√
(1− η)PTVz) + nr (10)
where nr ∼ CN (0, σ2r) is a circular symmetric complex AWGN.
The eavesdropper’s received signal, on the other hand, is
ye = g(
√
ηPTws+
√
(1− η)PTVz) + ne (11)
where ne ∼ CN (0, σ2e) is a circular symmetric complex AWGN
at the eavesdropper. The ideal AN shaping matrix V is chosen
such that it lies in the null-space of the user channel h, i.e. hV =
0Nt−1. Therefore the precoded AN term Vz will not affect the
user reception. Conversely, an additional noise term is “seen”
by the eavesdropper, which degrades her effective signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR). As a consequence, the eavesdropper’s capacity is
reduced, which results in an improvement of the secrecy capacity
between the BS and the intended user MT.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF PER-ANTENNA CE PRECODING
In this section, we study secrecy capacity of the per-antenna
CE precoding and MF precoding. For MF precoding as given by
(2), the ergodic capacity of the legitimate channel between the
BS and the intended receiving MT is
CMF = Eh
[
1 +
PT
σ2
‖h‖2
]
, (12)
where the expectation is over the distribution of h. By assumption,
all elements of h are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) complex Gaussian random variables (RVs) with zero mean
and unit variance. Then zh = ‖h‖2 =
∑Nt
i=1 h
2
i is the sum of
Nt i.i.d. exponential RVs with parameter λ = 1, which follows
Gamma distribution with shape parameter Nt and scale parameter
1. The ergodic capacity in (12) is then evaluated as [10]
CMF =
∫ ∞
0
log2
(
1 +
PT
σ2
z
)
exp(−z)zNt−1
Γ(Nt)
dz
=
1
ln 2
exp
(
σ2
PT
) Nt∑
n=1
En
(
σ2
PT
)
,
(13)
where En(·) is the generalized exponential integral [11] En(x) =∫∞
1
exp(−xt)
tn
dt. On the other hand, the ergodic capacity of the
eavesdropper channel is
CMF−Eve = Eg,h
[
log2
(
1 +
PT
σ2
∣∣∣∣g h†‖h‖
∣∣∣∣
2
)]
. (14)
Since h
†
‖h‖ is a normalized vector with i.i.d. complex Gaussian
entries and it is independent from g, the RV zg = g h
†
‖h‖ has
the same distribution as elements of g, i.e. zg ∼ CN (0, 1). As
a consequence, |zg|2 is exponentially distributed with parameter
λ = 1, and the ergodic capacity of the eavesdropper channel is
derived as
CMF−Eve =
1
ln 2
exp
(
σ2
PT
)
E1
(
σ2
PT
)
. (15)
The resulting ergodic secrecy capacity of MF precoding is
Csec−MF = [CMF − CMF−Eve]+
=
[
1
ln 2
exp
(
σ2
PT
) Nt∑
k=2
Ek
(
σ2
PT
)]+
,
(16)
where [·]+ denotes the max operation max{0, ·}.
Under the per-antenna CE constraint at the BS transmitter, the
achievable rate of the doughnut channel of the legitimate user,
given the channel coefficient h, is shown to be tightly lower
bounded by [4]
CCE|h ≥ log2
(
1 +
PT
σ2
M(h)−m(h)
e
)
≥ log2
(
1 +
PT
σ2
‖h‖21 − ‖h‖2∞
Ne
)
.
(17)
By taking expectation of (17) over the distribution of the channel
h, we can evaluate the lower bound of the ergodic capacity of
the doughnut channel as
CCE ≥ Eh
[
log2
(
1 +
PT
σ2
‖h‖21 − ‖h‖2∞
Ne
)]
. (18)
Unfortunately, a closed-form expression for (18) is difficult to
obtain. Numerical techniques need to be used to evaluate the
ergodic capacity lower bound (18). Similar to (3), with per-
antenna CE precoding, the received signal at the eavesdropper
is given by
yg =
√
PT
Nt
Nt∑
i=1
gie
jθui + n. (19)
Because θui , i = 1, . . . , Nt, are designed according to the mapping
(5), they are uniformly distributed phases and are independent of
the eavesdropper channel g. The RV yg can thus be written in
the form
yg =
√
PT
Nt
Nt∑
i=1
g′i + n =
√
PT
Nt∑
i=1
g′i√
Nt
+ n, (20)
where g′i have the same distribution as gi because they are
obtained by giving a uniformly distributed random phase rotation
to gi. It is straightforward to show that the summation term
gs =
∑Nt
i=1
g′i√
Nt
has the same distribution as gi, i.e. zero-mean
unit variance complex Gaussian distribution. Then |gs|2 follows
exponential distribution with parameter λ = 1. The ergodic
eavesdropper channel capacity for per-antenna CE transmission
is therefore
CCE−Eve = Egs
[
log2
(
1 +
PT
σ2
|gs|2
)]
=
1
ln 2
exp
(
σ2
PT
)
E1
(
σ2
PT
)
,
(21)
which is identical to the ergodic eavesdropper channel capacity
for MF transmission at the BS given by (14). The ergodic secrecy
capacity of the per-antenna CE precoding scheme can then be
determined by using (18) and (21) as
Csec−CE = [CCE − CCE−Eve]+. (22)
It is shown in [4] that the per-antenna CE transmission, by putting
more stringent power constraint to the transmit signal, suffers
from a performance loss in capacity compared with matched
filtering beamforming with average-only power constraint. As
CCE−Eve = CMF−Eve, the MF precoding will still outperform
per-antenna CE precoding in terms of secrecy capacity of the
system. However, we are going to show that by adding a carefully
designed artificial noise, significant improvement in secrecy ca-
pacity can be obtained without violating the stringent per-antenna
CE power constraint. The benefit of per-antenna CE precoding in
less complex RF hardware design is retained.
IV. PER-ANTENNA CE PRECODING FOR JOINT
SIGNAL-PLUS-AN SECURE TRANSMISSION
A. General Problem Formulation
We adopt the per-antenna CE constraint to the general AN-
based secure transmission model in Section II-B. The transmit
signal of the ith antenna then has the following general form
xi =
√
PT
Nt
(
αie
jθi + βie
jφi
)
=
√
PT
Nt
ejθ
u
i , i = 1, . . . , Nt,
(23)
where αi and θi are the amplitude and phase of the user
information part of the per-antenna CE signal on the ith antenna,
Fig. 2. The general per-antenna CE transmit signal for secure transmission
enabled by AN.
βi and φi are the amplitude and phase of the corresponding AN
part transmitted by the same antenna. θi, φi, and θui are phase
angles within the range (−pi, pi]. In order to guarantee the second
equality in (23) such that the per-antenna CE constraint holds,
we must have the following trigonometric relation
α2i + β
2
i + 2αiβi cos(θi − φi) = 1 (24)
for all i = 1, . . . , Nt. The relationship (24) is illustrated by Fig.
2, where the unit circle represents the normalized per-antenna CE
signal envelope.
Ideally the AN part of the transmit signal (23) is “invisible” to
the user, which requires
√
PT
Nt
Nt∑
i=1
hiβie
jφi = 0. (25)
On the other hand, the noise-free user information part of the
received signal, denoted
u =
√
1
Nt
Nt∑
i=1
αihie
jθi , (26)
is in the alphabet U of the information-bearing symbol expected
by the receiver. In addition, given the power allocation factor η
for joint signal and AN transmission, the parameters αi and βi
should also satisfy the equality condition∑Nt
i=1 α
2
i∑Nt
i=1 β
2
i
=
η
1− η . (27)
The general problem for joint signal-plus-AN secure transmission
in such a per-antenna CE system is to determine the parameters
(αi, θi) and (βi, φi) for all Nt antenna branches such that the
secrecy capacity of the system with respect to the eavesdropper
as in Section II-B is maximized.
However, because the parameter pairs (αi, θi) and (βi, φi) are
coupled through the nonlinear CE constraint characterized by the
relationships (24) and (27), the problem cannot easily be trans-
formed into a well-formulated per-antenna CE precoding problem
as in [4]. Some techniques must be employed to decouple the
information-bearing signal and the artificial noise while achieving
the design objective. We will address this problem in our proposed
design.
B. Two-Stage Per-Antenna CE Precoding for Joint Signal-plus-
AN Transmission
A straightforward way to decouple the information-bearing
signal and the artificial noise is to design one part first based
on certain criteria and then determine the other accordingly such
that the CE constraint holds. In a communication system we first
need to focus on the user information which should meet certain
requirements. Conversely requirement for the AN is usually loose.
We only try to introduce as much extra noise to the eavesdropper
as possible while minimizing the AN’s impact on user information
reception. The aggregate AN at the receiver should sum to zero
such that (25) holds. Therefore we propose to determine the
user signal first, which is then used to determine the AN to be
transmitted according to the per-antenna CE constraint.
As illustrated in Section II-B, ideally the AN shaping matrix
V should be in the null-space of the user channel such that the
aggregate AN at the receiver is equal to zero, regardless the
random noise z. However, this constraint is too stringent for
AN-based secure transmission in single-user large-scale MISO
systems. Note that the generated AN is deterministic for each
transmission. Therefore the null-space requirement is not neces-
sary. All we need is (25), which requires the aggregate AN at the
receiver is zero.
We consider per-antenna CE precoding for the user information
as in [4], i.e. we set αi = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , Nt. The precoder
mapping Φ(u) = Θu proposed in [4] is employed to find θi’s. It
was illustrated in [4] that with large number of transmit antennas,
which is the case of massive MIMO, there are low-complexity
gradient-based algorithms which gives Θu with small error norms∣∣∣u−∑Nti=1 hiejθi√Nt∣∣∣2.
With αi = 1, ∀ i, (24) is simplified to
β2i + 2βi cos(θi − φi) = 0 βi 6=0−→ βi = −2 cos(θi − φi). (28)
Accordingly, the “invisible” condition (25) is rewritten as (by
ignoring the scaling factors)
Nt∑
i=1
hi cos(θi − φi)ejφi = 0, (29)
in which φi, i = 1, . . . , Nt is the only variable, given that θi, i =
1, . . . , Nt have already been found based on the precoder mapping
Φ(u) = Θu. With sufficiently large Nt, we can always find a set
of φi, i = 1, . . . , Nt satisfying the “invisible” condition given in
(25). In this case, we obtain a “free” secrecy improvement from
the power consumption perspective, as the AN is designed to meet
the trigonometric relationship in (24).
C. Random-Phase AN Generation and AN Leakage Cancellation
Design of an optimal CE precoding mapping for the AN
generation scheme proposed in Section IV-B, from the secrecy
rate perspective, is nontrivial. Complexity of the algorithm there-
fore may become a big issue in practical implementations. In
this subsection, we propose an alternative scheme with low
complexity, which is enabled by one single additional antenna
element employing more sophisticated hardware.
A uniform AN phase φi is generated after determining the
signal phase θi. The AN amplitude which preserves the per-
antenna CE property of the combined transmit symbol is calcu-
Fig. 3. The random-phase AN generation and amplitude adjustment for per-
antenna CE transmission.
lated accordingly. This is named the random-phase AN scheme,
and the general idea of random-phase AN generation and the
amplitude adjustment for per-antenna CE transmission is shown
in Fig. 3.
As in the joint signal-plus-AN per-antenna CE secure trans-
mission scheme in Section IV-B, the signal part is designed by
adopting the per-antenna CE precoding. The AN phase φi is
randomly generated and uniformly distributed on (−pi, pi]. The
AN amplitude is determined by the phase difference between the
per-antenna CE signal and the random AN phase, as illustrated
in Fig. 3. The aggregated AN at the intended receiver, given by
yrAN1 =
√
PT
Nt
Nt∑
i=1
hiβie
jφi , (30)
is most likely non-zero. AN leakage will thus occur, which
degrades the secrecy capacity. Note that (30) is simply a scalar.
Therefore we can always add one single transmit antenna with
user channel gain h0 and transmit an additional AN signal
x0 =
−yrAN
h0
= β0e
jφ0 (31)
such that the overall aggregate AN at the receiver is equal to zero√
PT
Nt
Nt∑
i=0
hiβie
jφi = h0x0 + yrAN = 0. (32)
That is, we need only one extra antenna which does not satisfy
the per-antenna CE constraint in the system to completely cancel
the AN leakage due to the random-phase AN and CE constraint
on the other Nt antennas.
D. Secrecy Rate Evaluation
By assuming per-antenna CE information signals, the legitimate
user’s rate expression is the same as that in [4]. Therefore,
when calculating the achievable secrecy rate in this work, the
key is in how to evaluate the eavesdropper capacity. We next
show an upper bound of the eavesdropper capacity by taking the
correlation between two RVs, i.e. the information power and the
AN power into account. This upper bound is non-trivial for the
AN cancellation scheme given in Section IV-C (denoted Scheme
II), but becomes trivial for the scheme of Section IV-B (denoted
Scheme I). More effective ways to evaluate the eavesdropper
capacity under the nonlinear per-antenna CE constraint, which
remains an open problem, will be investigated in the journal
version.
For both AN generation schemes, the eavesdropper’s received
signal can be expressed as
yeve =
√
PT
Nt
Nt∑
i=1
gie
jθi +
√
PT
Nt
Nt∑
i=0
βigie
jφi + n
=
√
PTueve + nAN + n,
(33)
where we define ueve =
√
1
Nt
∑Nt
i=1 gie
jθi and nAN =√
PT
Nt
∑Nt
i=0 βigie
jφi
. The term n is the AWGN, which has zero
mean and variance σ2. For Scheme I, we have β0 = 0.
The above eavesdropper channel model (33) is similar to the
equivalent SISO channel model for the legitimate MISO system
demonstrated in [4]. The eavesdropper capacity is thus given by
CCE,E = sup
u
I(u;ueve), (34)
where the function I(·; ·) gives the mutual information between
two RVs. According to the eavesdropper’s equivalent SISO model
(33), we have the following Markov relationship
u↔ Θ↔ yeve ↔ ueve. (35)
By the data processing inequality [12], we must have I(u;ueve) ≤
I(Θ; yeve). Therefore we have the following upper bound of the
eavesdropper capacity
CCE,E = sup
u
I(u;ueve)
≤ sup
Θ
I(Θ; yeve) ≤ log2
(
1 +
Pueve
PnAN + σ
2
)
,
(36)
where PnAN = EΘ,Φ
[
(ueve + nAN)
2
]
−EΘ
[
u2eve
]
and Pueve =
EΘ
[
u2eve
]
. Note that the above power splitting approach over-
estimates the information signal power, which results in an
upper bound on Eve capacity. By redefining the power terms
in (36) as Pueve = EΘ,Φ
[
(ueve + nAN)
2
]
− EΘ
[
n2AN
]
and
PnAN = EΘ
[
n2AN
]
, a lower bound on the eavesdropper capacity
can be obtained instead.
It can be shown that based on the above eavesdropper capacity
upper bound and the corresponding signal-AN power splitting,
the approximate power terms for Scheme I are given as
Pueve = PT ‖g‖2/Nt, PnAN = 0, (37)
which completely ignores the AN power and therefore reduces to
a trivial upper bound. By substituting (37) into (36), the capacity
expression is identical to that for per-antenna CE precoding
(without AN), given in Section III.
The power terms for the eavesdropper capacity upper bound
with Scheme II can be calculated in a similar way.
Pueve = PT ‖g‖2/Nt, (38)
PnAN =
PT
Nt
· EΘ,Φ

(g0 ·
∑Nt
i=1 hiβie
jθi
h0
)2 . (39)
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Fig. 4. Ergodic secrecy capacity v.s. PT /σ2 for i.i.d. Rayleigh fading with
Nt = 100.
In both schemes, ueve are zero-mean Gaussian distributed with
variance Pueve . As Nt → ∞, according to the Central Limit
Theorem (CLT), we have√
PT
Nt
· g0
∑Nt
i=1 hiβie
jθi
h0
Nt→∞−→ N (0, PnAN). (40)
The resulting eavesdropper capacity upper bound for Scheme II
is thus non-trivial.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
secure constant envelope large-scale MISO system in terms of
ergodic secrecy capacity as a function of average channel SNR,
PT
σ2
. In Fig. 4, the curves achieved by MF precoding (MF without
AN in Fig. 4) and per-antenna CE precoding (CE without AN in
Fig. 4) are calculated based on (16) and (22), respectively. For the
curves achieved by AN-based schemes, including MF precoding
with AN and optimal power allocation for the maximization of
secrecy capacity (MF with AN in Fig. 4), and Scheme II (CE
with random AN plus cancellation, discussed in Section IV-C)
are obtained by Monte-Carlo simulations.
According to Fig. 4, we first observe that the performance
for linear MF and per-antenna CE transmission (without AN)
saturate at high-PT
σ2
regime, which motivates the AN-based trans-
mission scheme for security improvement. In contrast, Scheme
II described in Section IV-C results in a significantly higher
secrecy capacity, especially in the high-PT
σ2
regime. The antenna
element for leakage cancellation serves as an additional source of
AN to the eavesdropper to mask the legitimate communication.
The proposed method leads to comparable secrecy capacity
performance with conventional MF precoded transmission with
AN (optimal power allocation between data and AN [10]). We
consider it a non-trivial observation, as with the absence of AN,
the secrecy capacity gap between MF precoding and per-antenna
CE precoding is fairly large, especially in the high-PT
σ2
regime.
It indicates that with the proposed AN generation scheme, the
cheaper and more power efficient CE implementation of large-
scale MIMO can achieve secure transmission with performance
very close to linear MF precoder with AN. The only cost is one
extra antenna violating the per-antenna CE constraint. Although
not shown in our preliminary work, Scheme I of Section IV-B is
expected to achieve a similar performance as Scheme II, with an
expense of Nt iterations to find a group of φi’s satisfying (25).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have investigated secure transmission in large-
scale MISO systems under the per-antenna constant envelope
constraint. Based on a security analysis of the per-antenna CE
precoding scheme for large-scale MISO, we have proposed to use
joint signal-plus-artificial-noise transmission to improve security
in systems under the per-antenna CE constraint. A two-stage
per-antenna CE precoding framework for joint signal-plus-AN
transmission was proposed. In the first stage we determine the
per-antenna CE precoding for the information-bearing signal. A
properly generated artificial noise is incorporated into the transmit
signal such that the combined signal-plus-AN satisfies the CE
constraint and the AN part is “invisible” to the legitimate user.
It is shown that compared to conventional per-antenna CE trans-
mission, the joint signal-plus-AN secure transmission schemes
do not require additional transmit power. A low-complexity AN
generation scheme which requires an additional antenna element
to cancel the AN leakage to the intended user introduced by
randomly generated AN was also investigated.
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